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AL-SKEINI v. UNITED KINGDOM AND 
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 
UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
Samantha Miko* 
Abstract: In July 2011, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is-
sued its judgment in Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom. This case prompted the 
court to reconsider its conflicting lines of case law on the extraterritorial 
application of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). In its decision, the court validated both 
the “effective control of an area” and “State agent authority” models of 
analysis, which had until Al-Skeini both been employed by the court at dif-
ferent times to analyze the ECHR’s extraterritorial application. Ulti-
mately, however, the court ruled under an augmented version of the 
“State agent authority” model—adding a requirement that the state using 
force exercise some amorphous “public powers” over the extraterritorial 
area for ECHR Article 1 jurisdiction to attach. As a result, this decision, 
while greatly anticipated, has posed more questions for international law-
yers as to the ECHR’s extraterritorial application than it has answered. 
Introduction 
 On July 7, 2011, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
issued a landmark judgment on the extraterritorial application of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“European Convention for Human Rights,” “Convention,” 
or “ECHR”) in the case of Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom.1 In doing so, the 
court not only attempted to reconcile conflicting lines of case law in 
this area by reevaluating its conceptions of jurisdiction under the Con-
vention, but also tried to define more precisely how “exceptional” cir-
cumstances must be to justify extending a Contracting State’s jurisdic-
tion (and therefore responsibility to those allegedly injured) outside its 
                                                                                                                      
* Samantha Miko is a Managing Editor for the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. 
1 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 589 (2011). 
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borders and outside the Council of Europe.2 This decision, while on 
one hand a welcome clarification for international legal scholars on 
this point of ECtHR case law, maintains some of the ambiguities it 
sought to rectify and raises questions about its practical application for 
Contracting States’ actions abroad.3 
 Part I of this Comment provides a background on the facts of Al-
Skeini and the circumstances of British troops in Iraq from 2003 to 
2004, as well as a summary of the case’s procedural history in the U.K. 
domestic courts. Part II focuses on the two strains of ECtHR case law 
regarding ECHR jurisdiction, and summarizes the parties’ arguments 
about them before the ECtHR. Part III analyzes the reasoning of the Al-
Skeini opinion, examines the holding’s implications, and points out sev-
eral questions left unanswered by the case. 
I. Background 
 On March 20, 2003, the United States led a unified coalition of 
armed forces, including the United Kingdom, Poland, Australia, and 
Denmark, in the invasion of Iraq.4 By April 5, 2003, British forces had 
overtaken the city of Basrah, and by May 1, 2003, the coalition had de-
clared major combat operations in Iraq complete, turning their subse-
quent efforts toward reconstruction.5 In early May 2003, the occupying 
States created the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to serve as an 
interim quasi-governmental administrative body with legislative author-
ity until the area became secure enough to establish an Iraqi govern-
ment.6 Coalition States appointed representatives to the CPA and di-
vided Iraq into regional areas, with CPA South—including Basrah—to 
be controlled by the United Kingdom, with responsibility for the area 
to be vested in a U.K. Regional Coordinator.7 When the Governing 
Council of Iraq was established in July 2003, the Occupying Forces re-
quired the CPA to cooperate with the Governing Council on all matters 
relating to the temporary governance of Iraq.8 By June 28, 2004, the 
Interim Government, created by the Governing Council, assumed all 
                                                                                                                      
2 Marko Milanovic, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, 23 Eur. J. Int’l L. 121, 129–
31(2012). 
3 See id. at 131–33. 
4 See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 589, 597 
(2011). 
5 See id. 
6 Id. at 599. 
7 Id. at 600, 624. 
8 See id. at 602. 
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control of Iraq; this led to the CPA’s disbanding.9 Thereafter, the Mul-
tinational Force, including a large contingent from the United King-
dom, remained in Iraq pursuant to United Nations Security Council 
authorization and the request of the Iraqi government.10 
 By a Security Council Resolution, the international community 
recognized that, during this tumultuous period from May 1, 2003 to 
June 28, 2004, the United Kingdom was an occupying power over those 
areas of southern Iraq “where British troops exercised sufficient au-
thority for this purpose.”11 At the time, the United Kingdom was in 
command of the Multinational Division (South East), an area of 96,000 
square kilometers with a population of 4.6 million, containing the prov-
inces of Al-Basrah, Masyan, Thi Qar, and Al-Muthanna.12 In occupying 
this area, British forces were first responsible for maintaining its secu-
rity and reestablishing the Iraqi police and other Iraqi security forces.13 
Additionally, British forces were responsible for supporting the civil 
administration in Iraq.14 This multifaceted mission proved challenging 
for British military leadership, which described the post-major conflict 
situation in Iraq to the ECtHR as a “state of virtual anarchy.”15 
 All six Al-Skeini plaintiffs’ claims arose from the deaths of their ci-
vilian relatives, which occurred in Basrah during the period of U.K. oc-
                                                                                                                      
9 Id. at 604, 605. 
10 Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 605. 
11 Dominic McGoldrick, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in the UK Courts, 40 Isr. L. 
Rev. 527, 537 (2007) (“Iraq was a party to Geneva IV but not to its Additional Protocol 1 or to 
the Hague Convention; however, the Secretary of State accepted that the Hague Regulations 
and the material provisions of Additional Protocol 1 to Geneva IV were recognized as de-
claratory of customary international law and were therefore applicable as such to the United 
Kingdom’s occupation of Iraq.”); cf. S.C. Res. 1546, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 ( June 8, 
2004) (”[b]y 30 June 2004, the occupation will end and the Coalition Provisional Authority 
will cease to exist, and . . . Iraq will reassert its full sovereignty.”). 
12 Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 605. 
13 Id. at 605–06. 
14 Id. at 606. 
15 Id. at 606–07. The Al-Skeini decision quotes the British military’s Aitken Report, 
which concerned “the post-conflict situation in Iraq”: 
There was no Iraqi administration or governance. Fuel and potable water 
were in short supply, electricity was intermittent, and the hospitals were full of 
wounded from the combat operations phase. . . . Law and order had com-
pletely collapsed. The Iraqi Police Service had melted away; the few security 
guards who remained were old and incapable; and the Iraqi Armed Forces 
had been captured, disbanded or deserted. Criminals had been turned out 
onto the streets and the prisons had been stripped. The judiciary were in hid-
ing. . . . Crime was endemic and in parts of Basra[h] a state of virtual anarchy 
prevailed. 
Id. 
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cupation.16 Five of these six victims were allegedly killed by British 
troops on patrol.17 Following these deaths, internal investigations by the 
British military found that (1) the shooting deaths resulting from the 
first four incidents were within the applicable Rules of Engagement, (2) 
further investigation was unnecessary, and (3) three of the four families 
should receive charitable donations from the British Army Goodwill 
Payment Committee.18 
 The father of the fifth applicant, a drowning victim, filed suit in 
U.K. civil court against the U.K. Ministry of Defence, resulting in a set-
tlement from the Ministry and a formal apology from the British 
Army.19 The military did not produce the results of any ballistic tests, 
autopsy reports, or post mortems following the deaths in any of the first 
five cases, and no one outside the military conducted any investigations 
of any kind.20 The families of the deceased were never involved in the 
investigations that took place, and though the facts of each death were 
disputed, in each case military command accepted their soldiers’ de-
scriptions of the events.21 
 The sixth victim, Baha Mousa, was allegedly arrested by British 
troops, seriously mistreated, and killed while in detention at a British 
military base.22 Mousa’s father requested a civil remedy from the Minis-
try of Defence, after which the commanding officer ordered the Royal 
Military Police’s Special Investigation Branch to investigate.23 Subse-
quent court-martial proceedings against seven soldiers were followed by 
a civil complaint which resulted in a settlement and a formal public 
acknowledgement of responsibility.24 
 Prior to and separate from the fifth and sixth applicants’ civil 
complaints, the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence decided on March 
26, 2004, “in connection with the deaths of . . . the relatives of the six 
applicants, (1) not to conduct independent inquiries into the deaths; 
(2) not to accept liability for the deaths; [and] (3) not to pay just satis-
faction.”25 The victims’ families sought judicial review of the Secretary’s 
                                                                                                                      
16 See id. at 612–15, 617, 619. 
17 See id. at 612–15, 617–18. 
18 Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 613–14, 616; McGoldrick, supra note 11, at 538. 
19 Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 617–19. 
20 See McGoldrick, supra note 11, at 538. 
21 Id. 
22 See Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 619 (“Baha Mousa was found to have 93 identifi-
able injuries on his body and to have died of asphyxiation.”). 
23 McGoldrick, supra note 11, at 539. 
24 Id. 
25 Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 620. 
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decision, including a ruling that both the deaths and the refusal to in-
vestigate them constituted a violation of the ECHR.26 Of these thirteen 
cases, six—including applicants one, two, three, four, and six—went 
forward.27 The first five applicants were dismissed for lack of U.K. juris-
diction at each appellate level up through the House of Lords, which 
found only the sixth applicant’s claim to fall under U.K. jurisdiction.28 
Following these civil proceedings against the Ministry of Defence, the 
Secretary of State for Defence commenced a public inquiry into the 
death of the sixth applicant.29 Subsequently, all six applicants appealed 
on procedural grounds to the ECtHR, alleging that their relatives were 
within U.K. jurisdiction when killed, and that the United Kingdom vio-
lated ECHR Article 2 by not investigating the deaths.30 The ECtHR 
then had to answer: “(1) whether the deaths took place within the ju-
risdiction of the U.K. so as to fall within the scope of the European 
Convention for Human Rights (ECHR) and the Human Rights Act 
1998 (HRA), and (2) if so, whether there should be an independent 
inquiry to investigate the violations.”31 
II. Discussion 
A. The Complex Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law  
and Human Rights Law 
 International humanitarian law and human rights law occasionally 
operate concurrently, but often result in a grey area of overlap wherein 
countries engaging in activities abroad may be unsure to which body of 
law they may be held accountable.32 This question is of utmost impor-
tance because international humanitarian law is structured to serve as a 
floor, delineating a standard of conduct beneath which occupiers may 
                                                                                                                      
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 620–21. 
28 See id. at 621, 623–24, 626–27, 630 (emphasizing that, although each court found ju-
risdiction for the sixth applicant, they did so for different reasons). The House of Lords 
“recognise[d] the UK’s jurisdiction over Mr. Mousa only on the narrow basis found estab-
lished by the Divisional Court, essentially by analogy with the extra-territorial exception 
made for embassies.” Id. at 630. 
29 See id. at 620. 
30 Id. at 636. 
31 Joanne Williams, Al Skeini: A Flawed Interpretation of Banković, 23 Wis. Int’l L.J. 
687, 687 (2005). 
32 McGoldrick, supra note 11, at 527–28. 
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not sink.33 It does not, however, impose many of the positive human 
rights obligations guaranteed by the ECHR, specifically those regarding 
the investigation of use of lethal force.34 
 To begin its analysis in Al-Skeini, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR 
referred to the case law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
which first dealt with the difficult relationship between international 
human rights and humanitarian laws in its Advisory Opinion on the 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory.35 There, Israel argued that the human rights instruments to 
which it was a party did not apply to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
claiming that “humanitarian law is the protection granted in a conflict 
situation . . . whereas human rights treaties were intended for the pro-
tection of citizens from their own Government in times of peace.”36 
The ICJ disagreed, holding that “the protection offered by human 
rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save 
through the effect of provisions for derogation.”37 The ICJ further held 
that while States’ jurisdiction is primarily territorial, it may at times ex-
tend beyond national boundaries, making the human rights instru-
ments to which the State is a party applicable over foreign territory.38 
Finally, in its later judgment Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Terri-
tory of the Congo, the ICJ reaffirmed its finding that both international 
humanitarian law and human rights law must be considered in extra-
territorial exercises of jurisdiction, and that international human rights 
instruments could have extraterritorial application, “particularly in oc-
cupied territories.”39 
                                                                                                                      
33 Id. at 544. McGoldrick observes the “unexceptional” nature of the obligations placed 
on occupying forces, such as not committing murder, and not engaging in torture. Id. 
34 Id. (“[I]t is clear that the positive obligations under the ECHR (particularly on the 
planning and control of lethal force and the effective investigation of killings) could go 
much further than obligations under the law of occupation.”). 
35 See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 589, 630–33 
(2011); see also Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 102 ( July 9) [hereinafter Wall in Palestinian Terri-
tory]. 
36 Wall in Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 102. 
37 Id. ¶ 106. 
38 Id. 
39 Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 
168, ¶ 216 (Dec. 19). 
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B. Articles 1 and 2 of the ECHR and Banković v. Belgium 
 Article 1 of the ECHR reads: “The . . . Parties shall secure to every-
one within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I 
of this Convention.”40 Article 2 of the ECHR outlines the circumstances 
under which deprivation of life may be justified.41 It “requires by impli-
cation [of its reading alongside Article 1] that there should be some 
form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed 
as a result of the use of force by [State agents].”42 In light of Article 1’s 
limited jurisdictional scope, the ECtHR has provided clarification con-
cerning extraterritorial application through its case law, the most influ-
ential of which is Banković v. Belgium, decided in late 2001.43 
 In Banković, the ECtHR “established that the fact that an individual 
had been affected by an act committed by a Contracting State or its 
agents was not sufficient to establish that [the individual] was within 
that State’s jurisdiction.”44 According to Banković, jurisdiction within 
Article 1 was “essentially” territorial, and any extension of jurisdiction 
beyond the Contracting State’s territory was “exceptional,” requiring 
“special justification.”45 The court further noted that a Contracting 
State was obliged to secure all Convention rights and freedoms, which 
could not be “divided [or] tailored.”46 
                                                                                                                      
40 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (emphasis added). 
41 Id. art. 2. 
42 Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 656. 
43 See Milanovic, supra note 2, 121–22. 
44 See Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 639 (“[T]he Grand Chamber in Banković . . . con-
ducted a comprehensive review of the case-law, [and] identified a limited number of ex-
ceptions to the territorial principle.”); see also Williams, supra note 31, at 692. The facts of 
Banković are as follows: 
 On March 24, 1999, NATO announced the beginning of air strikes on ter-
ritory of the [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], with the aim of preventing a 
human rights catastrophe. In one such strike, NATO aircraft intentionally 
bombed the central Belgrade headquarters and studios of Radio Televisija 
Srbije (RTS), the Serbian state television and radio station, killing at least six-
teen civilians and wounding a further sixteen. 
 One person injured in the RTS attack and the relatives of five of the peo-
ple killed brought a case before the [ECtHR], alleging breaches of Articles 2, 
10, and 13 of the ECHR by NATO governments. . . . The court ultimately 
concluded that the impugned acts did not engage the responsibility of the re-
spondent states under the convention. 
Williams, supra note 31, at 690 (citations omitted). 
45 Banković v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE5, ¶ 59 (2007). 
46 Id. ¶ 73. 
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 Banković was the ECtHR’s first attempt at making sense of its con-
flicting case law on the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the ECHR, 
which until that point had followed two distinct strands.47 First, cases 
were decided based on the “effective control of an area” model, which 
holds that “a state possesses jurisdiction whenever it has effective overall 
control of an area.”48 Second, other decisions employed the “State agent 
authority” model, which held that “a state has jurisdiction whenever it 
exercises authority or control over an individual.”49 Though these two 
models are distinct legal tests, the ECtHR and its predecessor, the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights, have frequently discussed both 
models in the same cases.50 
 Yet, the relationship between these two strands of the case law has 
eluded international legal scholars, who have yearned for clarification 
from the ECtHR because “the question of extraterritoriality was never 
approached in a methodical way, and a number of deviations from the 
two models stood in between them.”51 Although many had hoped 
Banković would clarify which of these models was preferred, it did not.52 
“[T]he Court basically ignored the [State agent authority] model and 
control over individuals line of cases, which it did not even discuss.”53 
The case law following Banković further proved the inadequacy of the 
Banković court’s reasoning, because “inconsistencies and uncertainties” 
in the court’s subsequent case law revealed the court’s growing and 
“apparent unease with the rigidity of Banković.”54 The above legal de-
velopment provided the background for Al-Skeini and laid the founda-
tion for both parties’ arguments.55 
                                                                                                                      
47 Milanovic, supra note 2, at 122–23. 
48 Id. at 122 (emphasis omitted). 
49 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
50 See id.; see, e.g., Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74 & 6950/75, Admissibility Deci-
sion, 2 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 125, 136 (1975). 
51 See, e.g., Milanovic, supra note 2, at 122. 
52 See id. at 123 (“The Court has been much criticized for Banković, and rightly so.”). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 124–25 (noting that, in Issa v. Turkey, a Chamber of the Court applied both 
models of jurisdiction, while in Pad and Others v. Turkey the holding directly contradicted 
Banković). 
55 See id. at 125. 
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C. The Parties’ Arguments in Al-Skeini 
1. The Government 
 Before the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, the U.K. government 
advocated for the primacy of the Divisional Court’s reasoning, that on 
the issue of Article 1 jurisdiction, Banković “is a watershed authority,” 
and its selection of the “effective control of an area” model should 
therefore be upheld.56 
 The U.K. government further argued that Banković stood for the 
proposition that the Convention was “a multi-lateral treaty operating 
. . . in an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space 
(espace juridique) of the Contracting States.”57 In other words, the Gov-
ernment contended that State Parties had crafted the Convention to 
acknowledge the practical and legal challenges that Occupying States 
would face in implementing its provisions in occupied territory.58 
Moreover, because the Government suggested that these challenges 
would be particularly onerous when Member States occupy areas with 
value systems different from their own, it advocated for limits on the 
Convention’s application to its legal space.59 Because Iraq was outside 
the Convention’s legal space, the Government argued, it could not be 
applied there extraterritorially.60 
 The Government next submitted that Banković identified a “lim-
ited number of exceptions to the territorial principle” of jurisdiction.61 
It claimed the principal—and only applicable—exception62 could be 
invoked when a State, as a result of military action, exercised effective 
control of an area outside its territory but within the Convention legal 
space of the Council of Europe.63 Under these circumstances, the State 
exercising effective control must secure all Convention rights to the 
                                                                                                                      
56 Williams, supra note 31, at 688; see Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 639, 642. 
57 Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 639 (quoting Banković, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE5, ¶ 56). 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
60 See id. at 639–40. 
61 Id. at 639. 
62 See id. at 641 (“The Government accepted that it was possible to identify from the 
case-law a number of other exceptional categories where jurisdiction could be exercised by 
a State outside its territory and outside the Convention region. In Banković . . . the Grand 
Chamber referred to other cases involving the activities of diplomatic or consular agents 
abroad and on board craft and vessel registered in or flying the flag of the State.”). 
63 See Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 639 (“[D]espite dicta to the contrary in the subse-
quent Chamber judgment in Issa and Others v. Turkey . . . the Grand Chamber in Banković 
made it clear that the ‘effective control of an area’ basis of jurisdiction could apply only 
within the Convention legal space.”). 
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territory at issue.64 As noted above, the limitation of this exception to 
the Convention legal space was advocated by the British as a means to 
prevent the imposition of conflicting cultural values.65 
 Because “Iraq fell outside the Convention legal space,” the Gov-
ernment argued that “the ‘effective control of an area’ exceptional ba-
sis of jurisdiction could not apply.”66 The British domestic courts en-
dorsed this reasoning.67 Were the court to find Iraq fell within the 
Convention legal space, the United Kingdom further contended that it 
did not have “effective control” to any reasonable degree over the por-
tion of Iraq in question during the relevant time.68 Government noted 
that U.K. forces in Iraq faced systemic challenges in attempting to re-
store the order and security necessary for establishing the Iraqi self-
government.69 It argued that no reliable local law enforcement existed 
to stave off extensive crime, terrorism, and sectarian fighting.70 Fur-
thermore, it alleged the U.S.-controlled CPA, rather than the United 
Kingdom, exercised governing authority in Iraq during the relevant 
time.71 Beginning July 2003, a central Iraqi Governing Council and sev-
eral local Iraqi councils exercised that authority.72 
2. The Applicants 
 The applicants conceded that jurisdiction under Article 1 was pri-
marily territorial.73 However, they contended that previous ECtHR case 
law recognized that it was not exclusively so, naming both the “State 
agent authority” and “effective control of an area” models as recogniz-
ing the exceptional, extraterritorial State exercise of jurisdiction.74 The 
                                                                                                                      
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 640. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. The Government argued that it lacked effective control because: 
The number of Coalition Forces, including United Kingdom forces, was small: 
in South East Iraq, an area of 96,000 square kilometres and a population of 4.6 
million, there were 14,500 Coalition troops, including 8,150 United Kingdom 
troops. [U.K.] troops operated in Al-Basrah and Maysan provinces, which had a 
population of 2.76 million for 8,119 troops. 
See id. 
69 See Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 606–07. 
70 Id. at 640. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 643. 
74 Id. 
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applicants noted that the “State agent authority model” had been en-
dorsed previously in the case law, when the Commission held that 
“authorised agents of the State . . . not only remain under its jurisdic-
tion when abroad but bring any other persons or property ‘within the 
jurisdiction’ of that State, to the extent that they exercise authority over 
such persons or property.”75 Though in subsequent cases the court re-
lied on the “effective control of an area” model, the court had never 
expressly overruled the “State agent authority” model.76 To the con-
trary, in Loizidou v. Turkey, the court utilized both models equally.77 Ac-
cording to the applicants, no ECtHR case law precluded the use of the 
“State agent authority” model to connect direct actions by military state 
agents to the exercise of state authority.78 The applicants thus argued 
that the court could properly accept their claims as falling within U.K. 
jurisdiction under the “State agent authority” model by virtue of the 
authority and control exercised over their persons by U.K. agents at the 
time of their relatives’ deaths.79 
 Alternatively, the applicants argued that their relatives fell under 
U.K. jurisdiction because, under the “effective control of an area” 
model, the United Kingdom effectively controlled Southeast Iraq at the 
time.80 They argued against the Government’s proffered standard that 
applicants ought to show the State exerted “complete control” over the 
region, such as would be expected within its own territory.81 The appli-
cants claimed that this line of reasoning “would lead to the perverse 
position whereby facts disclosing a violation of the Convention would 
. . . form the evidential basis for a finding that the State did not exercise 
jurisdiction.”82 Furthermore, the applicants argued that the contention 
that the “effective control of an area” model could apply only within 
the Convention legal space was inconsistent with the court’s case law.83 
D. The Court’s Assessment 
 The Grand Chamber began by reaffirming the territorial nature of 
jurisdiction under the Convention, but noted that acts of Contracting 
                                                                                                                      
75 Cyprus v. Turkey, 2 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 136. 
76 Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 643–44. 
77 Id. at 644. 
78 Id. at 643–44. 
79 Id. at 644. 
80 Id. at 645. 
81 Id. 
82 Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 645. 
83 Id. 
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States occurring or producing effects outside their territories can, in 
exceptional cases, constitute exercises of jurisdiction within the mean-
ing of Article 1.84 It then addressed the parties’ arguments systemati-
cally, using both the “State agent authority” and “effective control of an 
area” models to define two exceptional circumstances when a Contract-
ing State’s Article 1 jurisdiction would extend extraterritorially.85 
1. Applying the State Agent Authority Model 
 After considering how it had employed the “State agent authority” 
model in the past, the ECtHR validated the reasoning of this model, 
concluding first that a Contracting State’s Article 1 jurisdiction would 
clearly extend extraterritorially to the acts of diplomatic and consular 
agents in foreign territory when they “exert authority and control over 
others.”86 
 In the same vein, the court reasoned that the extraterritorial use of 
force by a State’s agents against an individual, such as when an individ-
ual is taken into custody by military personnel abroad, could bring that 
individual under the State’s Article 1 jurisdiction.87 The court limited 
this exception, however, to situations in which State agent control is 
exercised not over buildings or vessels, but rather physically commands 
control over the person in question.88 In such situations, the State is 
under an obligation to secure the relevant rights of the Convention to 
the individual over whom it has bodily control.89 
 Having addressed the above discrete situations in which jurisdic-
tion would attach, the court carved its first major exception under 
which a State’s Article 1 jurisdiction would extend extraterritorially: to 
acts of State agents who “through the consent, invitation or acquies-
cence of the Government of that territory exercise all or some of the 
public powers normally to be exercised by that [consenting] Govern-
ment.”90 
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2. Applying the Effective Control of an Area Model 
 The court then validated the reasoning of the “effective control of 
an area” model, carving its second major exception to territorial juris-
diction under Article 1.91 It dispensed with the Government’s conten-
tion regarding “complete control” by highlighting that where the Oc-
cupying State’s territorial domination is obvious, examining whether it 
“exercises detailed control over the policies and actions of the subordi-
nate local administration” is unnecessary.92 The court then concluded 
that, under such circumstances, the State is obligated under Article 1 to 
secure within its area of control the rights guaranteed by the Conven-
tion.93 
3. Espace Juridique 
 The court forcefully dismissed the Government’s principal defense 
that its jurisdiction could not, in any event, be extended extraterritori-
ally beyond the Convention legal space.94 The court explained that it 
had never restricted the Convention’s applicability to the Convention 
legal space.95 Rather, it had in many instances held that occupation of 
one member state by another would create a legal vacuum in which the 
citizens of a State that had formerly enjoyed the rights of the Conven-
tion would no longer do so.96 It does not follow, in the court’s opinion, 
from this assertion that jurisdiction can never exist outside the Conven-
tion’s espace juridique.97 
4. Factual Findings in Al-Skeini 
 In Al-Skeini, the court found that, during the time period between 
the Ba’athist regime’s fall and the Interim Government’s establishment, 
the United Kingdom and the United States assumed some of the public 
powers expected of an Iraqi sovereign government.98 Specifically, the 
United Kingdom took on the responsibility of maintaining security in 
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Southeast Iraq.99 This created a “jurisdictional link” between the Al-
Skeini plaintiffs and the United Kingdom under Article 1.100 
 The court held that because the United Kingdom held jurisdiction 
over all applicants it was under an obligation, per Article 2, to give an 
effective official investigation into their relatives’ deaths.101 For these 
investigations to be effective, persons “independent from those impli-
cated in the events” needed to conduct them.102 Consequently, the court 
found a violation of the procedural duty under Article 2 regarding the 
first five applicants.103 Because the public inquiry into the sixth appli-
cant’s son, Baha Mousa, was almost complete at the time of the decision, 
the court noted that “the sixth applicant accepts that he is no longer a 
victim of any breach of the procedural obligation under [Article 2].”104 
III. Analysis 
 The Grand Chamber’s opinion in Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom is a 
welcome clarification of the court’s post-Banković v. Belgium case law, 
and is the closest that the ECtHR has come to overruling this confusing 
precedent.105 However, rather than overruling Banković, the court hy-
bridized the “State agent authority” and “effective control of an area” 
models, validating both, but in effect creating a third pseudo-model.106 
This pseudo-model incorporates the best of both prior models in an 
attempt to define more precisely how “exceptional” the “exceptional 
circumstances” must be to justify extending a Contracting State’s juris-
diction (and therefore responsibility to those whom it allegedly injures) 
outside its borders.107 
 In Al-Skeini, the ECtHR did not rule on whether the United King-
dom maintained effective control of the area of Basrah during the rele-
vant time period; it instead applied the “State agent authority” model to 
all six applicants, concluding that all of their relatives had been within 
the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction at the times of their deaths.108 Nev-
ertheless, the court noted that this outcome was “exceptional” because 
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the United Kingdom exercised “public powers” in Iraq.109 Under the 
court’s apparent hybrid reasoning, had the United Kingdom not exer-
cised such public powers, the modified “State agent authority” model of 
jurisdiction would have been inapplicable.110 Therefore, while the 
ECtHR found that all applicants were under the United Kingdom’s ju-
risdiction under the “State agent authority” reasoning, that reasoning 
extends only to situations where the State using force exercises some 
amorphous “public powers.”111 The result is a hybrid of the “State agent 
authority” and “effective control” models.112 
 Even with this new hybrid reasoning, Banković remains good law: 
“[i]n other words, Banković is, according to the Court, still perfectly cor-
rect in its result. While the ability to kill is ‘authority and control’ over 
the individual if the state has public powers, killing is not authority and 
control if the state is merely firing missiles from an aircraft.”113 The 
court thus incorporated Banković into its new line of reasoning as 
though its case law had always been consistent.114 Though still frustrat-
ing, the impact of Al-Skeini for international lawyers will be the affirma-
tion that under ECHR Article 1 both the “State agent authority” and 
“effective control of an area” models of jurisdiction can apply, and that 
the concept of espace juridique is irrelevant.115 
 The applicants did not argue that the killings were substantively 
unlawful under Article 2, but rather that the Government did not fulfill 
its procedural obligation under that provision to investigate the alleged 
victims’ deaths.116 The Government did not aggressively contest this 
claim: “even the UK Government essentially conceded that its investiga-
tive procedures in Iraq were not Article 2-compliant (e.g., because of 
the lack of institutional independence of the investigators from the 
military chain of command).”117 
 Although the significance of Al-Skeini rests in its holding on the ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction issue, it is important to note that in its discus-
sion of the applicants’ Article 2 claim, the court acknowledged that cha-
otic conditions in Iraq prevented the United Kingdom from fulfilling 
procedural obligations designed for implementation during peace-
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time.118 In doing so, the ECtHR noted its reluctance to place unrealistic 
procedural expectations on a government working to stabilize condi-
tions in hostile territory.119 Because the court ultimately still ruled that 
the United Kingdom violated Article 2, its ruling is a step toward greater 
substantive human rights protections for civilians in occupied areas— 
the court adopted a flexible approach, recognizing factual circum-
stances and thereby eliminating the role of Article 1 and its attendant 
jurisdictional issues as a shield from State liability under the ECHR.120 
 In Al-Skeini, as in Banković, the hesitancy shown in the ECtHR’s 
holding reflects underlying policy considerations that the court is still 
reluctant to address.121 These are the same policy considerations which 
weighed on the minds of the House of Lords when considering the six 
applicants in this case: 
[L]ike the ECtHR in Banković, the House of Lords in Al-Skeini 
did not want to open the floodgates of litigation [under the 
“State agent authority” argument] by considering every indi-
vidual against whom force was used as falling under the pro-
tection of the Convention. They did not want to micromanage 
the use of force in the field, especially when some of the kill-
ings in question may even have been justified.122 
The court’s holding demonstrates the ECtHR’s discomfort with the 
“State agent authority” model, which sets its desire for universal protec-
tion of human rights and human dignity against the competing desire 
to avoid becoming the arbiter of each individual killing abroad by 
European states.123 This is a task the ECtHR is “institutionally unsuited 
for,” as it lacks the necessary evidence and familiarity with international 
humanitarian law.124 
 Furthermore, the arbitrary nature of the “exceptional” line that the 
court has drawn in the extraterritorial jurisdiction sand complicates 
ECtHR jurisprudence, and will continue to frustrate human rights activ-
ists in the wake of Al-Skeini.125 It is understandable, given prior case law 
and the above policy considerations, why the court felt compelled to 
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reinforce its position that extraterritorial jurisdiction is “exceptional,” 
and to validate both the “State agent authority” and “effective control of 
an area” models, ultimately affirming the former while amending its 
application.126 However, the definition of “exceptional,” which limits the 
anticipated—and troublesome—onslaught of individual suits, is arbi-
trary.127 
 Al-Skeini has left a number of other questions unanswered and also 
brought new questions to the fore.128 Among these questions is the 
scope of positive procedural obligations owed by occupying govern-
ments.129 Also, because the court limited its discussion to the procedural 
aspects of Article 2, the court left open how the ECHR would substan-
tively apply alongside relevant international humanitarian law in an oc-
cupation context.130 Finally, it is unclear how the court would analyze a 
“reverse Al-Skeini scenario,” wherein a U.K. soldier may have sought to 
invoke rights under the ECHR against his own government.131 
Conclusion 
 Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom is a landmark judgment and is 
set to replace Banković v. Belgium as the leading ECtHR precedent on 
ECHR Article 1 extraterritorial jurisdiction. By its Al-Skeini judgment, 
the court attempted to reconcile its conflicting lines of case law, ulti-
mately validating both the “effective control of an area” and “State 
agent authority” models of jurisdiction, and dismissing the espace ju-
ridique argument as a State defense in the process. In so reasoning, 
however, the court added another layer of complication to the “State 
agent authority” model it ultimately applied. As a result, important 
questions remain unanswered and require further court interpretation 
of the extraterritorial application of the ECHR. This is much to the 
dismay of the international legal community and European military 
commanders, both of whom continue to seek predictability and clarity 
in this area of the law. 
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